(Editor’s Note: Stewart, known worldwide for his experience in identifying, reducing and managing risk associated with disasters, filed his thoughts and concerns with us when he returned to the states this week from Haiti. Stewart has been there, done it, and survived to tell tales and teach lessons learned.)
I believe people and agencies that responded to the Haitian earthquake of January 2010 went in with certain expectations to provide help, comfort, supplies and services to the people of Haiti.
Most had a plan that included volunteers and supply replacement that was dynamic. Within 24 hours they could bring in what was necessary by air. They thought their plans were good. They were incredibly naive. Disaster management on the ground in Haiti was nonexistent in early days and sadly has not improved to the level it needs to be some two weeks following the event.
Difficulties in getting in to the country, despite intelligence most had from people on the ground and political connections, should have served as a warning to the difficulties they would encounter upon arrival. Many aid groups started out from Miami with an arrival time slot to Port-Au-Prince airport (PAP) that was often cancelled when they were ready to depart, and often rescheduled for the next day. Many diverted to the Dominican Republic and drove into Haiti. Upon arrival it became very clear that most were unprepared for the task at hand.
Aid groups had no clue the infrastructure of the country was so poor. In spite of this realization, they went about their work as best they good.
One medical team that I spoke with told me they expected a hospital with most services and medical equipment in place, although limited. The hospital they arrived at had running water, electricity and two functional operating rooms. In their naiveté they did not expect that the two anesthesia machines would not work, the autoclave that would sterilize instruments would be inadequate, no sterile saline, and no local staff. The staff was a group of voluntary providers who, like them, had made it there on their own.
As a result, they requested more supplies from stateside, which were loaded for the trip to Haiti. The plane landed as planned, equipment was loaded on a truck and subsequently hijacked between the airport and the hospital.
At the hospital they had zero security, despite promises it would be provided. They decided as a group that the situation for them was unworkable, supplies were running out, the team was exhausted, and safety was a huge concern. They had no workable extraction plan for resupply. The team decided to make their way to the airport.
Armed Jamaican soldiers were necessary to escort them out. They made it to the airport on back of a pickup track, and arranged flight on a commercial plane that was headed to Canada. There they had a private jet pick them up for the trip back to the states.
Many aid groups that traveled to Haiti to give of their time and expertise have repeated the above situations.
- The issues most aid groups were unprepared for:
- The amount of human devastation
- The complete lack of infrastructure in the country
- The lack of support
- The complete lack of any organization on the ground
- Lack of security
They should have understood and known before they departed that the above conditions would be present.
Another medical volunteer that I spoke with stated, “no one was in charge, we had the first functional up and running hospital in the PAP area, yet no one, and I mean NO ONE, came to the hospital to assist or inquire about our capabilities or supplies we may need to be more efficient.” Sadly this is the norm.
Disasters like this need organization on a much higher level than has been available at all levels. Currently there is no one obviously running the show and aid is still chaotic at best. Well-meaning groups, including medical teams and mission groups, are coming to Haiti with no plan of what they are going to do. Volunteers that have arrived have quickly become delusional as to their role. Many have departed.
I would like to add that the response from well-meaning men and women has been tremendous. But much more than well meaning is needed in such a disaster. Volunteers that wish to aid such events in the future must get training and expect the unexpected. They must commit to work with what is available and not pack up and go home when things are not to their liking or understanding. Sadly, when the next disaster strikes I am afraid there will be a repeat of mistakes with few “lessons learned.
One last thought — the men and women of the large NGOs, such as
Worldvision, Doctors Without Borders, Mercy Corp., etc., are doing it right as they have worldwide for many years. They have the experience and well-trained staff. They come prepared and stay until job is done to the best of their abilities. They are the models that others must learn to follow.